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   The 1949 Geneva Conventions are remarkable achievements of 
international law. They reflect hard-won, finely tuned, and time-tested 
common ground between the broadest possible array of States. The 
Conventions united States—wealthy and poor, developed and developing, 
democratic and authoritarian, theocratic and secular, peaceful and bellicose. 
Although voluminous, these treaties have generated relatively few 
reservations or caveats from States Parties despite taking on the deeply 
fraught subject of how to regulate war. 
It is hardly surprising then that projects to update or reimagine the law 
of war would seize upon the Geneva Conventions as a mechanism for doing 
so. They offer auspicious potential for reform, for few international legal 
instruments promise the extensive reach and legitimacy that the Conventions 
do.1 To channel reform through them is to bind every State in the 
international system and to leverage a legal tradition backed by over 150 
years of iterative and largely proven regulation of war. Additionally, by virtue 
of the Conventions’ incorporation into domestic implementing legislation 
and the constitutive documents of major international criminal tribunals, 
reforms fed through the Conventions enjoy compounded impact in national 
and international judicial proceedings.2 
Rather than through adoption of an additional protocol to the 
instruments, as has occurred three times since 1949, such efforts to reform 
regulation of the conduct of hostilities can manifest as a reinterpretation of 
the existing text of the Geneva Conventions.3 Reform in the guise of 
                                                 
1. While customary international law also binds all States, it is rarely supported by the 
clear and overt indicia of State consent and consensus that is evidenced by 194 ratifications 
and accessions made to the Conventions. 
2. The ICRC maintains a survey of national legislation implementing the Geneva 
Conventions and their Protocols. See National Implementation of IHL: Documentation, ICRC, 
https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/ihl-domestic-law/documentation. The 
Conventions also feature in the subject matter jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals 
such as the International Criminal Court. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court art. 8(a), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
3. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
















interpretation—at least as conceived in some circles—avoids the arduous 
diplomatic and procedural trappings of treaty formation or amendment. 
“Amendment by interpretation” can be accomplished by comparatively 
efficient means. Securing consensus among prominent academics, 
endorsement by an active private organization, or adoption by a panel of 
experts or jurists can—again as conceived in some circles—stand in the place 
of a full diplomatic conference. Just such an effort to reinterpret Common 
Article 1 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions is underway. That effort is 
gaining acceptance in influential, if not authoritative, spheres of the law of 
war.  
Common Article 1 rests atop each of those instruments in identical text 
and is mirrored in a nearly indistinguishable form in Protocols I and III to 
the Conventions.4 It simply states, “The High Contracting Parties undertake 
to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all 
circumstances.”5 The article performs double duty, both opening each of the 
1949 Conventions, which lack substantial preambles, and imposing the 
Conventions’ first obligation of conduct on States.  
A plain reading of Common Article 1 does not provoke particularly 
noteworthy comment. Indeed, a pillar of the law of war community, the late 
Frits Kalshoven, observed over two decades ago that the article “may look 
like a perfect example of a truism.”6 It largely expresses a corollary to the 
                                                 
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Adoption of 
an Additional Distinctive Emblem, Dec. 8, 2005, 2404 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Additional 
Protocol III]. 
4. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art 1(1); 
Additional Protocol III, supra note 3, art. 1.  
5. Article 1(1) of both Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol III, supra note 3, 
substitute “this Protocol” for “this Convention” in the 1949 Conventions. 
6. Frits Kalshoven, The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances: From 













general international legal obligation of States to honor their treaty 
commitments as binding, expressed classically in the maxim pacta sunt 
servanda.7  
Yet, Common Article 1 has garnered increasing attention from 
academics and private organizations as a vessel for a reimagination of States’ 
enforcement obligations under the Geneva Conventions. Inspired by a 
judgment of the International Court of Justice,8 as well as by an advisory 
opinion by that tribunal,9 academic writers and private organizations have 
iteratively reinterpreted the article well beyond its original and established 
meaning. They chiefly claim that subsequent practice has modified the 
obligation to “ensure respect” for the Conventions to apply beyond a State’s 
own organs and groups it controls during an international armed conflict.10 
For them, the article includes a novel and additional “external” obligation—
a duty on the part of all States to use all available means to ensure respect 
for all provisions of the Conventions by all other States during all armed 
conflicts, even those to which the State in question is not a party.11 Adding 
weight to the claim, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
has adopted this view in three successive volumes of its influential updated 
commentaries on the 1949 Geneva Conventions.12  
                                                 
7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
8. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Paramilitary Activities]. 
9. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall]. 
10. See e.g., Robin Geiss, The Obligation to Respect and Ensure Respect for the Conventions, in 
THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 109 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta 
& Marco Sassoli eds., 2016); Oona A. Hathaway et al., Ensuring Responsibility: Common Article 
1 and State Responsibility for Non-State Actors, 96 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 539, 569–77 (2017). 
11. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, Common Article 1 of the Geneva 
Conventions Revisited: Protecting Collective Interests, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS 67 (2000). 
12. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO GENEVA 
CONVENTION III RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR ¶¶ 153–222 
(forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter ICRC, 2021 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA 
CONVENTION III]; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO 
GENEVA CONVENTION II FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE 
WOUNDED, SICK, AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA ¶¶ 147–48, 
175–79, 186–95 (2017) [hereinafter ICRC, 2017 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA 
CONVENTION II]; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO 











Despite its putatively humanitarian motivation, this reworking of 
Common Article 1 warrants caution. The law of war is meant to reflect not 
only what is desirable in terms of humanity. It is also always sensitive to 
preservation of States’ military interests during armed conflict, as well as the 
realities of sovereignty in the international system.13 Significant 
reinterpretation of the carefully struck, and often hard-won, bargains struck 
by States at treaty conferences, especially when the resulting instruments 
enjoy universal adoption, calls for comparably compelling supporting 
evidence.  
Although the 2016 and 2017 updated commentaries to, respectively, 
Geneva Conventions I and II Geneva Convention 1 took a categorical 
approach to the assertion that Common Article 1 includes an external 
obligation, the recently released 2020 updated commentary to Geneva 
Convention III has correctly conceded that “[t]here is disagreement as to the 
legal nature of the positive component of the duty to ensure respect by 
others because the content of the obligation is not clearly defined and its 
concretization to a large extent left to the High Contracting Parties.”14 In 
light of that acknowledgment, this article takes a fresh look at the meaning 
of Common Article 1.15  
                                                 
WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶¶ 125–26, 153–79 (2016) 
[hereinafter ICRC, 2016 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I]. 
13. See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian 
Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 795 
(2010). 
14. ICRC, UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III, supra note 12, ¶ 
202. 
15. For discussions of Common Article 1, see, inter alia, Verity Robson, The Common 
Approach to Article 1: The Scope of Each State’s Obligation to Ensure Respect for the Geneva 
Conventions, 25 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 101 (2020)[hereinafter Robson]; 
Hathaway et al., supra note 10; Geiss, supra note 10; Knut Dörmann & Jose Serralvo, Common 
Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the Obligation to Prevent International Humanitarian Law 
Violations, 96 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 707 (2014); Robert Kolb, 
Commentaires Iconoclastes sur L’obligation de Faire Respecter le Droit International Humanitaire Selon 
L’article 1 Commun des Conventions de Genève de 1949, 46 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 513 (2013); Carlo Focarelli, Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: 
A Soap Bubble?, 21 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (2010); Tomasz 
Zych, The Scope of the Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for International Humanitarian Law, 
27 WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 251 (2009); Maya Brehm, The Arms Trade 
and States’ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, 6 JOURNAL OF 
CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 359 (2008); Alexandre Devillard, L’obligation de Faire Respecter 












We reject claims that the various obligations to ensure respect ever 
encompassed an external obligation or that their meaning has changed since 
the adoption of the relevant treaties. State practice engaged in out of a sense 
of legal obligation that is necessary to support the reimagined obligations is 
quite simply lacking. Indeed, sufficient “negative State practice” exists to 
preclude any possibility that Common Article 1 obligations extend to 
ensuring respect by other States or that it applies outside the context of an 
international armed conflict 
In our view, the Common Article 1 obligation to “ensure respect” refers 
to the legal duty of States that are party to an international armed conflict, 
and Party to the instruments, to take those measures that are required to 
ensure their nationals and others under their control comply with the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and Protocols I and III. During those conflicts, they 
impose no obligations on States that are not party to an armed conflict, apart 
from those few obligations that expressly bind States during peacetime. 
Instead, obligations set forth in those instruments are shouldered chiefly by, 
and owed to, belligerent States—not to individuals and only rarely to non-
belligerent States —as a matter of law. For the time being, we call for fidelity 





                                                 
Protocole Additionnel, Fondement d’un Droit International Humanitaire de Coopération?, 20 REVUE 
QUÉBÉCOISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 75 (2007); Marco Sassòli, State Responsibility for 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 84 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 
401 (2002); Birgit Kessler, The Duty to “Ensure Respect” under Common Article 1 of the Geneva 
Conventions: Its Implications on International and Non-International Armed Conflicts 44 GERMAN 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 498 (2001); Kalshoven, supra note 6, at 8; Azzam, 
Fateh, The Duty of Third States to Implement and Enforce International Humanitarian Law, 66 
NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1997); Hans-Peter Gasser, Ensuring Respect 
for the Geneva Conventions and Protocols: The Role of Third States and the United Nations, in 2 ARMED 
CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW: EFFECTING COMPLIANCE 15 (Hazel Fox & Michael Meyer 
eds., 1993); Paolo Benvenuti, Ensuring Observance of International Humanitarian Law: Function, 
Extent and Limits of the Obligations of Third States to Ensure Respect of IHL, YEARBOOK OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 27 (1989–90); Luigi Condorelli & 
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Quelques Remarques a` Propos de L’obligation des Etats de 
“Respecter et Faire Respecter” le Droit International Humanitaire “en Toutes Circonstances, in ETUDES 
ET ESSAIS SUR LE DROIT HUMANITAIRE ET SUR LES PRINCIPES DE LA CROIX-ROUGE EN 











II. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF COMMON ARTICLE 1 AND ITS PROGENY 
 
As indicated above, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and to a great extent 
their Protocols, are remarkable accomplishments of legal consensus. 
Although universally ratified (or acceded to), the Conventions are not 
uniformly understood; varying interpretations of certain key provisions have 
been proffered by States, jurists, academics, and international and private 
organizations. Indeed, properly discerning their actual meaning often 
involves the delicate and challenging task of treaty interpretation. The first 
step in that process is to ascertain the original meaning of the provision in 
question. Only once that task is accomplished satisfactorily can any 
contemporary interpretation be confirmed as authoritative. 
 
A. Development and Negotiation of Common Article 1 
 
The obligation to “respect” the terms of a law of war treaty first appeared in 
Article 82 of the 1929 Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War and Article 25(1) of the 1929 Geneva Convention on the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field.16 Those 
provisions provided that the 1929 Geneva Conventions “shall be respected 
by the High Contracting Parties in all circumstances.” The “in all 
circumstances” clause largely confirmed the notion of “non-reciprocity.” In 
other words, the instruments continued to bind belligerents that were Party 
to them even when an adversary had violated their terms. It further 
emphasized that the Conventions’ obligations applied regardless of the 
Parties’ legal justification, or lack thereof, for resorting to war. 
States later reproduced the 1929 Conventions’ references to “respect” 
and “in all circumstances” in Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and Article 1(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I and 2005 
Additional Protocol III. There is no apparent disagreement as to the 
meaning of the term “respect;” the obligation requires States to honor the 
provisions of the respective instruments. Even without this provision, the 
actions of a State’s armed forces or other organs, as well as the activities of 
armed groups under the State’s “effective control” pursuant to the law of 
                                                 
16. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 
47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 













State responsibility,17 would qualify as internationally wrongful acts of the 
State should they contravene its duties under the treaties.18 The respect 
provision simply serves to make this point within the four corners of the 
treaties. 
The fact that the 1949 Geneva Conventions’ and their Protocols’ 
incorporated the term “in all circumstances” in an unamended manner 
requires the phrase’s original meaning to be borne in mind. There is no 
indication that the drafters of, or the States Parties that adopted, those 
instruments intended a different meaning. Nor does practice evince any 
subsequent agreement among the States Parties to embrace a changed or 
expanded meaning of the term. Accordingly, the phrase can only be 
interpreted as having the meaning originally attributed to it in the 1929 
Conventions. It simply denotes an obligation on the part of Parties to an 
armed conflict to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions even in 
situations in which the enemy does not do so and regardless of casus belli. It 
in no way operates to extend the obligations found in Common Article 1 
and its progeny beyond international armed conflict or to States that are not 
party to the conflict.  
Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 1(1) of 
Additional Protocols I and III deviate, however, from the 1929 texts through 
the addition of an obligation to “ensure respect.” As is apparent from the 
negotiating history, the addition of the term was designed to broaden the 
“respect” obligation to the population as a whole. In other words, States 
Parties now shouldered an obligation to take measures necessary to ensure 
those under their control also complied, as appropriate, with the 
instruments.19 There is no indication that the phrase was meant to have 
“external effect” in the sense of imposing on Parties an obligation to take 
                                                 
17. G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, art. 8, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility]. Although Article 8 refers 
to direction or control, the commentary thereto encompasses them in the widely accepted 
notion of “effective control.” Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 
53 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 48, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2). 
18. Internationally wrongful acts require (1) breach of a legal obligation, whether based 
in treaty or customary international law, that is (2) attributable to a State pursuant to the law 
of State responsibility. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 17, art. 2. 












positive steps to ensure respect by belligerent States even when the former 
do not exercise effective control over belligerents and are not party to the 
armed conflict themselves. On the contrary, States like France, Norway, and 
the United States objected to a broad understanding of the obligation.20 
Indeed, as Professor Sir Adam Roberts noted in 1995, there “appears to 
be little or nothing in the records of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference to 
suggest an awareness on the part of government delegates, or indeed ICRC 
participants, that the phrase ‘to ensure respect’ implied anything beyond 
internal observance.”21 This view is shared by the late Professor Frits 
Kalshoven in what is the most in-depth inquiry into the subject to date.22 
After an exhaustive study of the matter, Professor Kalshoven concluded: 
 
The point remains that the primary legal obligation arising from common 
Article 1 is for States Parties to impose respect for the applicable rules of 
international humanitarian law, ‘in all circumstances’, on their armed 
forces, including armed groups under their control, and on their 
populations: for the implementation of this obligation they can be held 
legally responsible. No such legal liability attaches to their moral duty to 
endeavour to ensure respect by their peers. Since it is their right to do this 
under the law of treaties, they cannot be reproached for doing so either.23 
 
The original commentaries to the 1949 Geneva Conventions prepared 
under the general editorship of Jean Pictet and published in the authors’ 
private capacities between 1952 and 1960 are likewise supportive of this 
position.24 Appearing soon after the Conventions entered force, the so-called 
                                                 
20. See the compelling discussion of how the matter was addressed at the conference 
in Robson, supra note 15, at 112–13. 
21. Adam Roberts, The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts, 6 
DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 30 (1995). 
22. Kalshoven, supra note 6, at 11–38.  
23. Id. at 60. 
24. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO II GENEVA 
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE WOUNDED AND SICK AT SEA (Jean Pictet ed., 1960) 
[hereinafter 1960 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION II]; INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE 
TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR (Jean Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter 1960 
COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION III]; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE 
RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION 
OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR (Jean Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter 1958 












“Pictet Commentaries” are not official, authoritative, or binding 
documents.25 They amount to a commendable effort to explain the treaties 
based on the participation of the authors in the diplomatic negotiations.  
Addressing the inclusion of the “ensure respect” provision, the 
commentary the Geneva Convention I provided: 
 
The use of the words “and to ensure respect” was, however, deliberate: 
they were intended to emphasize and strengthen the responsibility of the 
Contracting Parties. It would not, for example, be enough for a State to 
give orders or directives to a few civilian or military authorities, leaving it 
to them to arrange as they pleased for the details of their execution. It is 
for the State to supervise their execution. Furthermore, if it is to keep its 
solemn engagements, the State must of necessity prepare in advance, that 
is to say in peacetime, the legal, material or other means of loyal 
enforcement of the Convention as and when the occasion arises.26  
 
Thus, the authors understood “ensure respect” to be an internal duty 
shouldered by parties to an armed conflict to take action to supervise 
compliance with the Conventions by individuals they controlled, including 
by virtue of territorial control.27 There is no disagreement that this was at 
least the intention of the States that adopted the four Conventions at the 
Diplomatic Conference in 1949.  
                                                 
CROSS, COMMENTARY TO II GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE WOUNDED AND 
SICK (Jean Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter 1952 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION I]. 
25. The foreword to each of the four original commentaries includes the following 
passage:  
Although published by the International Committee, the Commentary is the personal work 
of its authors. The Committee, moreover, whenever called upon for an opinion on a 
provision of an international Convention, always takes care to emphasize that only the 
participant States are qualified, through consultation between themselves, to give an official 
and, as it were, authentic interpretation of an intergovernmental treaty. 
1960 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 24, at 1; 1960 COMMENTARY 
ON GENEVA CONVENTION III, supra note 24, at 1; 1958 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA 
CONVENTION IV, supra note 24, at 1; 1952 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION I, 
supra note 24, at 1. 
26. 1952 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 24, at 26. 
27. For instance, the International Court of Justice has acknowledged an obligation to 
ensure respect on the part of a party in occupation of territory. Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 











Yet, Pictet and his colleagues did not understand the term to create any 
binding external obligation for States that were not party to the conflict. If 
they had, they would have continued to express themselves in obligatory 
terms. They did not. On the contrary, when addressing the external factor in 
the context of the ensure respect obligation, they characterized “ensure 
respect” in hortatory terms. For instance, the same commentary observed, 
“in the event of a Power failing to fulfill its obligations, the other Contracting 
Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) may, and should, endeavor to bring it back to 
an attitude of respect for the Convention.”28 The other three commentaries 
contain similar language.29  
What the Pictet Commentaries clarified with respect to the original 
meaning of Common Article 1 was that attempts by States that are 
uninvolved in an armed conflict (neutral States) to bring belligerent States 
into compliance with the Conventions would not constitute prohibited 
intervention into the latter’s internal or foreign affairs.30 They cannot be read 
in context to suggest the existence of any legal duty on the part of States that 
are not party to an international armed conflict to seek compliance by 
belligerent States, even in circumstances in which such efforts would likely 
be successful. 
 
B. Common Article 1 in Context 
  
To fully assess the meaning and scope of a treaty provision, it is also 
necessary to apply “secondary” rules of international law governing their 
interpretation. The generally accepted rules of interpretation are set forth in 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, even for States that are not 
Party to that instrument, such as the United States.31 According to Article 
31(1) of that instrument, “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
                                                 
28. 1952 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 24, at 26 (emphasis 
added). 
29. 1960 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 24, at 25–26; 1960 
COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION III, supra note 24, at 18; 1958 COMMENTARY ON 
GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 24, at 16 (emphasis added). 
30. On the prohibition of such intervention, see Paramilitary Activities, supra note 8, ¶¶ 
202–5. 














accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”32  
As to the ordinary meaning of “ensure respect,” it is appropriate to look 
to other rules of international law when interpreting a provision.33 Imbuing 
the term with an “external component” would be unusual from an 
international law perspective. States are seldom responsible for ensuring other 
States’ compliance with international law, and almost never to such an extent 
that failure to take feasible measures to preclude another State’s 
internationally wrongful act would itself be a violation. Rather, they must act 
to ensure their own compliance by controlling the activities of State organs 
and others for whom the State is legally responsible. One possible exception 
is the so-called “due diligence” duty to put an end to ongoing hostile 
activities by other States from the one’s territory if they seriously affect a 
third State’s international law right. However, that somewhat unsettled 
obligation derives from the right to sovereignty over territory and therefore 
cannot be analogized to the purported ensure respect external obligation, 
which implicitly rejects limitation based on territorial control.34  
To discern treaty context, particular note must be taken of the structure 
and text of the instrument in question.35 In this regard, most of the 
obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions are imposed only on States 
that are party to the conflict, and the instruments are, with the notable 
exception of Common Article 3 and limited peacetime obligations,36 largely 
                                                 
32. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 31(1). 
33. Id. art. 31(3)(c). 
34. See discussion in TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 550–51 (Michael N. Schmitt gen. ed., 2017). A State 
may, however, be responsible for internationally wrongful acts of another State if it directs 
and controls the commission of the latter’s internationally wrongful act. It may also be 
responsible for its own aid and assistance in another State’s unlawful conduct. See Articles 
on State Responsibility, supra note 17, arts. 16–17.  
35. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 31(2). 
36. These include disseminating the Conventions and training one’s own armed forces. 
Geneva Convention I, supra note 4, art. 47; Geneva Convention II, supra note 4, art. 48; 
Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 127; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 4, art. 144. 
They also include enacting legislation to provide penal sanctions for violations of the 
Conventions and for preventing and repressing misuse of the distinctive protective 
emblems. Geneva Convention I, supra note 4, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 4, 












applicable only during international armed conflicts.37 The Conventions also 
expressly set forth the situations in which States must or may act vis-à-vis the 
activities of other States. For instance, Article 12 of Geneva Convention III 
imposes a duty to monitor the treatment accorded prisoners of war who 
have been transferred to another State.38 Additionally, the instruments 
specifically contemplate roles for certain States in fostering compliance by 
belligerent States. Most significant among these is service by neutral States 
as Protecting Powers on behalf of belligerent States.39 Finally, the negotiating 
history of the Conventions contains examples of situations in which the role 
of States that are not party to an armed conflict was discussed. Article 52 of 
the Geneva Convention I, for instance, provides for an enquiry procedure 
in case of violation by a belligerent State.40 During the Diplomatic 
Conference that led to the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, the 
delegates agreed that only belligerent States, and not any Party to the 
Convention, could initiate such an enquiry.41 
It also bears noting that the obligations set forth in the Geneva 
Conventions tend to specify whether they apply in peace, during armed 
conflict, or both. For example, States are obliged to engage in dissemination 
and training during peacetime to ensure respect by their armed forces and 
the civilian population.42 Yet, the sole “external” peacetime obligation is to 
search for and prosecute or extradite those individuals who have committed 
a grave breach of the Conventions.43 Therefore, a broad contextual reading 
of the treaties augurs against an interpretation that would incorporate a 
                                                 
37. Of course, Additional Protocol I is inapplicable in non-international armed conflict 
and therefore its “ensure respect” provision cannot be interpreted otherwise. See Additional 
Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 1(3). 
38. Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 12. 
39. See Geneva Convention I, supra note 4, art. 10; Geneva Convention II, supra note 4, 
art. 10; Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 10; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 4, 
art. 11. See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 5. 
40. The remaining Conventions also provide for enquiry procedures between 
belligerent States. Geneva Convention II, supra note 4, art. 53; Geneva Convention III, supra 
note 4, art. 132; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 4, art. 149. 
41. 1952 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 24, at 375–77. 
42. See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 4, art. 47; Geneva Convention II, supra 
note 4, art. 48; Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 127; Geneva Convention IV, supra 
note 4, art. 144; Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 83; Protocol Additional II, supra 
note 5, art. 19. 
43. Geneva Convention I, supra note 4, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 4, art. 
50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 4, art. 












peacetime external obligation to ensure respect, especially when no specific 
mention has been to that effect. 
It is, therefore, counter-contextual to suggest that upon ratification of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, States understood they were impliedly 
shouldering legal obligations regarding the activities of other States beyond 
those already expressly set forth in the Conventions. Instead, they 
understood that “ensure respect” was meant to impose purely internal 
obligations and that, with limited exceptions like the obligation to prosecute 
or extradite war criminals, those obligations applied only to States that were 
parties to an international armed conflict. A more expansive obligation is 
also illogical given the very significant burden the purported obligation 
would have imposed, a burden far greater than that they assumed pursuant 
to an ensure respect provision that was limited to an international armed 
conflict to which they were party. Had States intended to accept an 
obligation to ensure respect for the Conventions by parties to an armed 
conflict to which they themselves were not a party, the obligation would have 
been set forth in explicit terms.  
 
III. SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS 
  
It remains to be determined, however, whether the meaning of the Common 
Article 1 and Article 1(1) obligations to “ensure respect” has changed since 
their adoption by States in the Geneva Conventions. According to Article 
31(3) of the Vienna Convention on Treaties, in addition to context,  
 
There shall be taken into account, together with the context:  
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation….44  
 
This requires consideration of those subsequent agreements and the practice 




                                                 











A. Subsequent Agreement 
 
The two Additional Protocols of 1977 and that of 2005 were meant to 
supplement the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which continued to apply fully.45 
This being so, it is noteworthy that while Article 1(1) of Additional Protocols 
I and III replicates the text of Common Article 1 of the Geneva 
Conventions, and therefore serves to reiterate the obligations contained in 
the earlier articles with respect to international armed conflict, Additional 
Protocol II, which applies only in non-international conflict, contains no 
comparable provision. This distinction between Additional Protocols I and 
II is especially relevant to the issue of whether Common Article 1 applies to 
non-international armed conflicts, a matter discussed more fully below. 
The inclusion of the “ensure respect” obligation in Article 1(1) of 
Protocols I and III raises the question of whether the understanding of that 
duty, at least on the part of States Parties to the two instruments, had evolved 
to encompass an external obligation. It had not. In particular, and as 
accurately noted by Professor Kalshoven, there is no indication that the 
States that adopted Additional Protocol I at the final Diplomatic Conference 
in 1977 intended it to encompass a new external obligation.46 Even advocates 
of an external component to the “ensure respect” duty concede this point. 
For instance, in a 2016 article, Professor Robin Geiss acknowledged that 
“the drafting history of the Additional Protocols, in and of itself, is rather 
inconclusive on the matter, and if viewed in combination with the travaux 
préparatoires of the 1949 Conventions, would rather seem to militate against 
acceptance of an external compliance dimension of the obligation to ensure 
respect.”47 
As with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the text of Article 1(1) must be 
read in the context of the entire instruments. Additional Protocol I’s text 
bears directly on the matter. Articles 7 and 89 set forth mechanisms for 
ensuring respect by other States. Article 7 provides for meetings of the 
Parties to the Protocol in the event of “general problems concerning the 
                                                 
45. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, pmbl.; Additional Protocol II, supra note 3, 
pmbl.; Additional Protocol III, supra note 3, pmbl. 
46. Kalshoven, supra note 6, at 45–54. 
47. Geiss, supra note 10, at 121. As to Additional Protocol III, Verity Robson of the 
United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, writing in her personal capacity, has 
convincingly dispensed with any notion that the “ensure respect” text in that instrument 












application” of the Conventions or the Protocol.48 Article 89 further 
provides that “[i]n situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of 
this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or 
individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity with 
the United Nations Charter.”49 It would be illogical to suggest that States 
believed it necessary to specifically provide for cooperation with the United 
Nations (which was already lawful pursuant to Chapters VI and VII of the 
U.N. Charter50) in the face of violations by other States during international 
armed conflicts to which the former were not party but saw no need to 
affirm a far less settled obligation to act on their own accord in such 
situations. This is especially so given that the text of Article 1(1) of 
Additional Protocol I tracked that of Common Article 1, which did not 
encompass such an obligation, with nearly surgical precision. Simple logic 
compels the conclusion that Article 1(1) was not meant to alter or 
supplement the Common Article 1(1) meaning of the term “ensure respect.” 
Furthermore, Additional Protocol I provides for an optional 
International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission in Article 90. The 
Commission may investigate a situation alleged to involve a grave breach or 
other serious violation of the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol I. 
An investigation is mandatory if the States concerned are Parties to the 
Protocol and have made a formal declaration accepting the Commission’s 
competence. The parties to a conflict may also agree to refer the matter to 
the Commission on an ad hoc basis. As with the corresponding articles of the 
1949 Conventions, these provisions are compelling evidence that States 
resolved to enumerate means for external enforcement for Additional 
Protocol I rather than rely on Article 1 or any other provision to imply such 
remedial measures. 
 
B. Subsequent State Practice 
 
When interpreting a treaty provision, consideration of State practice that 
indicates agreement as to its interpretation is likewise appropriate.51 By the 
same token, a lack of practice consistent with a claimed interpretation, or 
contrary practice by one or more Parties to the treaty in question, 
demonstrates the absence of agreement among the Parties as to the validity 
                                                 
48. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 7.  
49. Id. art. 49. 
50. U.N. Charter chs. VI–VII. 











of a new interpretation. Such practice can consist of a failure to take feasible 
measures supposedly required by the purported norm, activities that would 
run counter to it, and verbal practice in the form of statements that dispute 
the existence of the claimed new interpretation.  
For subsequent State practice to bear on a proposed interpretation of a 
treaty obligation, it must be clear that the activities engaged in (or refrained 
from) were the product of the State’s sense of legal obligation and not, for 
instance, political concerns, national interests, or ethical commitments. 
Absent this sense of opinio juris, the practice in question is not evidence of 
the meaning of the provision in question.52  
Subsequent State practice has not substantiated agreement among the 
Parties to the respective instruments that the term “ensure respect” now 
includes an external element.53 To begin, States that are not party to a conflict 
regularly fail to take affirmative measures that are feasible in the 
circumstances, or indeed any measures at all, to ensure that belligerent States 
respect the relevant instruments. For example, it is almost always feasible for 
States Parties to publicly condemn belligerent States that have breached the 
Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol I during an international armed 
conflict. Yet many, indeed most, States remain silent in the face of patent 
violations.54 If States are under an obligation to take feasible measures to 
ensure respect by other States involved in an armed conflict to which they 
are not party, every such failure to condemn would be itself an internationally 
wrongful act. In fact, given the frequency of armed conflict, most States 
would be in violation of their purported ensure respect obligation most of 
the time during an international armed conflict in which they were not 
involved.  
                                                 
52. As has been noted in an unofficial commentary to the Vienna Convention,  
The active practice should be consistent rather than haphazard and it should have occurred 
with a certain frequency. However, the subsequent practice must establish the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation. Thus, it will have been acquiesced in by the other 
parties; and no other party will have raised an objection.  
MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 431 (2009).  
53. For criticism of the State practice cited by the ICRC in its updated commentaries, 
see Robson, supra note 15, at 107–8. 
54. To take one example, consider the relative silence by States during the armed 
conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008 in the face of repeated law of war violations. 
See 2 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN 













States do not see themselves or other States as acting unlawfully when 
they fail to speak out or take other feasible measures to ensure respect. Even 
when States do condemn violations, they frequently forgo other measures 
that might prove effective to draw a belligerent State into compliance with 
its obligations under the law of war, including those appearing in treaties 
with ensure respect provisions. For instance, a State may condemn breaches 
by a belligerent State but continue to trade with that State. As an example, in 
2015, the United States accused Russia of engaging in serious violations 
during its international armed conflict with Ukraine.55 Yet, that same year, 
Russian imports to the United States totaled over $16 billion.56  
Similarly, consider the case of Saudi Arabia and arms trade. Saudi-led 
operations in support of the government of Yemen began in 2015. Since 
then, its operations repeatedly have been condemned as violating many law 
of war rules.57 Yet, in July 2019, President Trump vetoed a bipartisan attempt 
by Congress to ban the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia,58 while the United 
Kingdom decided to renew the issuance of arms export licenses for the sale 
or transfer of arms to the country following litigation in the Court of 
Appeals.59 Indeed, Saudi Arabia is today the biggest arms importer in the 
world,60 with such countries as Canada, France, Spain, Serbia, Georgia, South 
                                                 
55. See, e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2015: 
UKRAINE (2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/253123.pdf. 
56. Trade in Goods with Russia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,  https://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c4621.html#2015 (last visited Dec. 18, 2020). 
 57. See generally Reports of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts (on Yemen), 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/43, pt. 1 (Aug. 17, 2018), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/42/17 (Aug. 9, 2019), 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/45/6 (Sept. 28, 2020). 
58. Merrit Kennedy, Trump Vetoes Bills Intended to Block Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, NPR 
(July 25, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/25/745200244/trump-vetoes-bills-
intended-to-block-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia. 
59. Elizabeth Truss, Secretary of State for International Trade, United Kingdom, 
Statement to Parliament: Trade Update (July 7, 2020), https://questions-
statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2020-07-07/HCWS339. 
60. USA and France Dramatically Increase Major Arms Exports; Saudi Arabia is Largest Arms 














Africa, and Turkey supplying major weapons.61 While the Saudi case is not 
directly on point because the conflict in Yemen is non-international in 
character, it is indicative of the attitude of many States toward pressuring 
States to desist in law of war violations. This is not to say that they 
countenance such violations, but rather to observe that other national 
interests may militate against enforcement measures in particular cases. 
Not only does State practice fail to establish an external component to 
the Conventions’ “ensure respect” obligation, but some State legal advisers 
assert that their States do not shoulder such an obligation as a matter of law. 
Writing a half-century after adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, for 
instance, Professor Kalshoven noted: 
 
[S]everal legal advisers, when asked whether they regarded common Article 
1 as imposing an obligation upon their governments to ensure respect of 
the Conventions by other states, all answered in the negative. They did 
however believe that their governments, as parties to the Geneva 
Conventions, were definitely entitled to appeal to parties to armed conflicts 
to respect the applicable humanitarian law.62 
 
His discussions of the matter with the then senior lawyer of the ICRC (and 
lead author of the ICRC’s commentary to the Additional Protocols), as well 
as the organization’s president, also suggested that for other States, “ensure 
respect” was primarily hortatory in nature and the obligation essentially 
moral, as distinct from legal.63  
In a more unambiguous expression of opinio juris, then U.S. State 
Department Legal Advisor, Brian Egan spoke directly to the issue at the 
April 2016 meeting of the American Society of International Law. He 
asserted: 
 
Some have argued that the obligation in Common Article 1 of the Geneva 
Conventions to “ensure respect” for the Conventions legally requires us to 
undertake such steps and more vis-à-vis not only our partners, but all States 
and non-State actors engaged in armed conflict. Although we do not share 
this expansive interpretation of Common Article 1, as a matter of policy, 
                                                 
61. Angela Dewan, These Are the Countries Still Selling Arms to Saudi Arabia, CNN (Nov. 
23, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/22/middleeast/arms-exports-saudi-arabia-
intl/index.html. 
62. Kalshoven, supra note 6, at 59–60. 












we always seek to promote adherence to the law of armed conflict generally 
and encourage other States to do the same. As a matter of international 
law, we would look to the law of State responsibility and our partners’ 
compliance with the law of armed conflict in assessing the lawfulness of 
our assistance to, and joint operations with, those military partners.64 
 
With respect to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Egan’s statement negates 
the existence of agreement among the States Parties regarding any new 
external component to the Common Article 1 ensure respect obligation. 
Australia,65 Canada,66 and the United Kingdom are among other States 
publicly taking, or unofficially indicating, a similar position.67 
 
IV. REIMAGININGS OF COMMON ARTICLE 1 
  
As noted, international tribunals, international organizations, and the ICRC 
have sought to reframe the ensure respect obligation to include an external 
component. Their arguments are tenuous, for they ignore extensive negative 
State practice and expressions of opinio juris that preclude reinterpretation of 




                                                 
64. Brian Egan, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Keynote Address at the 
American Society for International Law: International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the 
Counter-ISIL Campaign, (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Egan-ASIL-speech.pdf; audio available at https://www.asil. 
org/resources/audio/2016-annual-meeting. 
65. John Reid, Ensuring Respect: The Role of State Practice in Interpreting the Geneva Conventions, 
ILA REPORTER (Nov. 2016), http://ilareporter.org.au/2016/11/ensuring-respect-the-role-
of-state-practice-in-interpreting-the-geneva-conventions-john-reid/. At the time, Reid was 
Head of the Office of International Law in the Attorney-General’s Department. 
66. Turp v. Minister of Foreign Affairs, [2017] F.C. 84 (Can.) (Affidavit of Michael N 
Schmitt in support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs position).  
67. Writing in her personal capacity, although, tellingly, an attorney at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, Robson noted  
There is no general duty to prevent or bring to an end breaches by other parties to conflict. 
Responsibility for compliance lies with the parties themselves, and other States may choose, 
as a matter of policy, to take such steps as are appropriate in each conflict to encourage 
universal respect. 











A. The International Court of Justice 
 
Proponents of the expansive approach to Common Article 1 argue that the 
International Court of Justice endorsed external application of the “ensure 
respect” obligation in its Paramilitary Activities judgment.68 The case examined 
U.S. support of the Contras, an insurgent group involved in a non-
international armed conflict with Nicaragua's government.69 Although the 
Court took notice of the Common Article 1 “ensure respect” obligation, at 
issue in the case was US “encouragement” of law of war violations by the 
Contras, who were funded, trained, and equipped by the United States. Of 
particular note was dissemination by the Central Intelligence Agency of a 
psychological warfare manual that contained advice on how to engage in 
activities, including the assassination of certain civilians, that were manifestly 
unlawful.70  
States undoubtedly are obliged by international law to refrain from 
actively encouraging violations of either treaties to which they are Party or 
“cardinal” rules of the law of war, such as the prohibition on attacking 
civilians, that are, in the words of the International Court of Justice, 
“intransgressible.”71 However, that obligation stems from general principles 
of international law, such as the obligation to carry out treaty obligations in 
good faith,72 not from Common Article 1. For instance, by encouraging 
violations by the Contras, the United States breached its obligation to respect 
the Conventions and other rules of the law of war.73 Moreover, in the facts 
of the Paramilitary Activities case, the obligation not to encourage violations 
also derived from the customary international law prohibitions of 
intervention into the internal affairs of other States and of the use of force 
(both of which the Court concluded the United States violated).74 The point 
is that the Court addressed the issue of encouragement of non-State actors; 
it never dealt with the issue of whether States have a legal obligation to take 
                                                 
68. Paramilitary Activities, supra note 8. 
69. On the prohibition of such intervention, see id. ¶ 219. 
70. Id. ¶ 122. 
71. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶¶ 78–79 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. 
72. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 26. See also Villiger, supra note 49, at 366–67.  
73. Paramilitary Activities, supra note 8, ¶ 220. 












affirmative measures to ensure respect by other States that are party to an 
armed conflict.  
A second International Court of Justice case typically cited in discussions 
of the term “ensure respect” is the Wall advisory opinion. In a fractured 
opinion, the Court suggested other States were obliged to act to influence 
Israel to respect its obligations in “occupied Palestinian territory” pursuant 
to Article 1 of Geneva Convention IV.75 Although the facts of Wall are more 
directly on point than those of the Paramilitary Activities case, the opinion has 
proved highly controversial in light of the very politicized nature of the 
subject matter. 
The Wall case is of particular relevance in that it opines that the 
obligations found in Common Article 1 are erga omnes,76 and therefore all 
States had an obligation “to ensure compliance by Israel with international 
humanitarian law as embodied in [Geneva Convention IV].”77 This is a 
misapplication of the notion. Erga omnes obligations are allegedly owed to all 
States without the requirement of reciprocity. Accordingly, while all States 
are entitled to invoke the “responsible” State’s responsibility for having 
engaged in an internationally wrongful act,78 purported erga omnes status of a 
rule does not impose any obligation of enforcement on other States, the 
breach of which would itself be internationally wrongful. 
Further detracting from the significance of the Court’s work is the fact 
that neither the Paramilitary Activities judgment nor the Wall advisory opinion 
provided any substantive analysis of the ensure respect obligation. Surely the 
Court would have been aware of the well established and agreed original 
meaning of Common Article 1. To depart from that meaning should have 
                                                 
75. Wall, supra note 9, ¶ 158. 
76. Erga omnes obligations are “[O]bligations of a State towards the international 
community as a whole. . . . By their very [they] are the concern of all States. In view of the 
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection . . . .” Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Second Phase), 
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5).  
77. Wall, supra note 9, ¶¶ 157–58. On the erga omnes characterization of Common Article 
1, see also Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 519 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000). The ICRC shares this view. ICRC, 2021 UPDATED 
COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III, supra note 12, ¶ 210.  
78. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 17, art. 48(1)(b). See also Application of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Gam. v. 











required the Court to survey State practice extensively for evidence of 
agreement to expand the meaning of Article 1.  
Yet, the Court’s judgment and advisory opinion include no such effort 
or evidence. Rather, its assertions are highly conclusory. As noted by Judge 
Kooijmans in his separate opinion in the Wall case: 
 
The Court does not say on what ground it concludes that [Article 1] 
imposes obligations on third States not party to a conflict. The travaux 
préparatoires do not support that conclusion.  
. . .  
Since the Court does not give any argument in its reasoning, I do not feel 
able to support its finding. Moreover, I fail to see what kind of positive 
action, resulting from this obligation, may be expected from individual 
States, apart from diplomatic démarches.79 
 
Additionally, it must be stressed that advisory opinions are non-binding, 
while judgments in contested cases like the Paramilitary Activities case bind 
only the States before the Court.80 In light of the shallow analysis, 
disagreement among the judges, and the nonbinding nature of the findings 
on States other than those before the Court, the judgment and opinion 
represent unreliable evidence of an external element to the ensure respect 
obligation. 
 
B. International Organizations 
 
Proponents of the expansive interpretation of Common Article 1 point to 
other sources that also fail to establish the requisite foundation for 
interpretive deviation from the original meaning of Common Article 1.81 For 
instance, United Nations General Assembly resolutions, which are 
nonbinding and may reflect political and other considerations on the part of 
States that support them, are sometimes cited. However, States have 
formally and correctly objected to reliance on such instruments as examples 
                                                 
79. Wall, supra note 9, at 230–31, ¶¶ 47, 50 (separate opinion by Kooijmans, J.). Judge 
Kooijmans spoke approvingly of, and cited from, the Kalshoven analysis. Additionally, 
Judge Higgens noted that the “Final Record of the diplomatic conference . . . offers no 
useful explanation of that provision.” See id. at 217, ¶ 39 (separate opinion by Higgens, J.). 
80. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 59. 












of State practice or opinio juris.82 And to the extent that such resolutions do 
not reflect State practice or are opposed by some States, they, as explained 
above, cannot serve authoritatively as evidence that States Parties to the 
Conventions have reinterpreted the ensure respect obligation. 
Similarly, advocates of the expansive interpretation cite United Nations 
Security Council resolutions in support of their view.83 Although such 
resolutions may sometimes qualify as State verbal practice for those States 
sitting on the Council that vote for them, they do not constitute evidence of 
the position of other States because those States are expressing no view at 
all. Nor do they even necessarily reflect dispositive evidence of the legal 
position of the States voting for them. As with General Assembly 
resolutions, they are often the product of political, policy, and other 
motivations, rather than definitive expressions of a State’s views regarding 
the existence of a particular legal norm or its appropriate interpretation. For 
instance, the United States voted for a Security Council resolution that 
“call[ed] upon the high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention 
of 1949 to ensure respect by Israel, the occupying Power, for its obligations 
under the Convention in accordance with article 1 thereof.”84 However, as 
clearly illustrated by State Department Legal Adviser Egan’s statement 
above, the United States rejects any obligation to ensure respect vis-à-vis 
States that are party to a conflict to which the United States is not party.  
  
C. Private Publications 
 
Unsurprisingly, private proponents of an expansive interpretation of 
Common Article 1 often accord undue weight to purported evidence in their 
work. A number of examples illustrate this tendency.  
In both its 2005 Customary International Humanitarian Law study and the 
three updated commentaries, the ICRC highlighted the 1968 Teheran 
International Conference on Human Rights as a significant example of 
                                                 
82. Letter from John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State & 
William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, U.S. Department  of Defense to Jakob Kellenberger, 
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Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, 89 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 443 (2007). 
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subsequent practice.85 The Conference adopted Resolution XXIII, which 
stated that Parties to the Geneva Conventions sometimes failed “to 
appreciate their responsibility to take steps to ensure the respect of these 
humanitarian rules in all circumstances by other States, even if they are not 
themselves directly involved in an armed conflict.”86 Yet, as Professor 
Kalshoven pointed out, the participants “accepted without debate a text that 
was so weak as to be almost meaningless.”87 Indeed, as Knut Dörmann, the 
senior legal advisor to the ICRC,  noted in 2014, “it is not absolutely clear 
whether the term ‘responsibility’ referred to a legal obligation or something 
less.”88 
Similarly, the Customary International Humanitarian Law study pointed to a 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly resolution as evidence of such an obligation, 
as did the aforementioned ICRC legal advisor in an academic article.89 In 
fact, all the NATO resolution does is remind States of their “obligation, 
under the Geneva Conventions, not only to ‘respect’ but also to ‘ensure 
respect’ of the Conventions in all circumstances.”90 It is true that States 
shoulder an obligation to ensure respect for the Conventions in all 
circumstances. The question, however, concerns the substantive content of 
the obligation. There is no indication in the NATO resolution that the 
Assembly was referring to any binding obligation that non-Parties to the 
Kosovo conflict take action to ensure respect of IHL by parties to that 
conflict.  
As noted above, treaty interpretation admits subsequent agreements that 
bear on the meaning of the provision in question. However, private 
proponents of the expansive view of Common Article 1 sometimes apply 
this rule of treaty interpretation inappropriately. For example, citing the 
                                                 
85. ICRC, 2016 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 12, 
¶ 156; ICRC, 2017 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 12, 
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aforementioned Tehran Resolution XXIII and a U.N. General Assembly 
resolution,91 the 2016 ICRC Commentary on Geneva Convention I notes: 
 
It was in full knowledge of these developments that the [ensure respect] 
clause was reaffirmed in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol I, and later in 
Article 38(1) of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 
1(1) of the 2005 Additional Protocol III. The 2013 Arms Trade Treaty, 
which subjects arms transfer decisions to respect for humanitarian law by 
the recipient, refers explicitly to the obligations to respect and to ensure 
respect.92 
 
However, as explained, Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol I cannot be 
read as suggested. And with regard to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, a careful reading of that instrument yields the opposite conclusion. 
Article 38(1) provides “States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure 
respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in 
armed conflicts which are relevant to the child.”93 The text “applicable to 
them in armed conflicts” demonstrates that “ensure respect” in the case of 
this instrument refers to obligations borne by States that are parties to an 
armed conflict. Moreover, Article 2(1) provides that “States Parties shall 
respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each 
child within their jurisdiction.”94 The “within their jurisdiction” clause 
denotes an obligation of States that exercise control over the territory or 
persons in question, not an obligation with respect to the activities of other 
States.  
As to Additional Protocol III, which establishes a new distinctive 
emblem in addition to the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Article 1(1) simply 
replicates the ensure respect language found in the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol I.95 Despite the fact that the question of ensuring respect 
for the Conventions and Protocols by other States had surfaced by 2005, 
neither the preamble to the instrument nor its articles goes beyond the 
requirement to ensure respect found in the earlier instruments. Moreover, 
the subject is left undeveloped in the ICRC Commentary to Protocol III 
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94. Id. art. 2(1). 











produced two years later.96 Had States wished to expand the scope of the 
notion of ensure respect, Additional Protocol III would have represented an 
excellent opportunity to do so; but apparently, they did not. 
Beyond such overstatements, advocates of an external component in 
Common Article 1 seldom cite actual examples of States having taken 
affirmative measures to ensure respect for the Conventions by other States. 
Nor do they even proffer significant examples of situations in which one 
State criticizes another for its failure to comply with a purported legal duty 
to take measures to ensure a third State complies with the Conventions 
obligations during armed conflict. Finally, and perhaps most critically, they 
offer no account of rampant “negative practice,” that is, those instances in 
which States fail to take measures to ensure respect by other States. 
In light of the thin support for a legally binding external element in the 
ensure respect obligation, as well as significant State practice to the contrary, 
it is clear that the expansive view cannot be supported as a matter of the 
extant law. State practice shows that the obligation to “ensure respect” in the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols I and III does not apply to a 
State that is not a party to an armed conflict.  
 
V. CONFLICT NOT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER 
 
Those who support an expansive interpretation of ensure respect also 
suggest that the obligation applies in non-international armed conflict.97 Of 
course, Additional Protocol I is limited to international armed conflicts, 
including conflicts against “colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of . . . self-determination . . . .”98 Thus, 
only the question of the applicability of Common Article 1 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions to non-international armed conflicts is at issue. 
In interpreting Common Article 1, it is essential to bear in mind the 
historical circumstances in which States negotiated and adopted the 1949 
Geneva Conventions. Until adoption of the Conventions, international law 
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was generally silent with respect to internal conflicts. Such conflicts were 
deemed to be the concern, consistent with the principle of sovereignty, of 
the State in which they took place. However, in light of such conflicts as the 
Spanish Civil War and Greek Civil War, States participating in the diplomatic 
conference leading to adoption of the Geneva Conventions agreed that some 
degree of regulation, albeit far less than that which was to apply in 
international armed conflicts, was necessary. That step was cautiously taken, 
with only a single substantive article devoted to such conflicts in each of the 
four Conventions—Common Article 3. 
The Pictet commentaries confirm that Common Article 1 was not meant 
to apply to the non-international armed conflict situations addressed by 
Common Article 3. For example, the Commentary to Geneva Convention I, 
published just three years after adoption of the Conventions, provides “[i]f 
the Convention was to include provisions applicable to all non-international 
conflicts, it was necessary, as we have seen, to give up any idea of insisting 
on the application to such conflicts of the Convention in its entirety.” 
Legally, therefore, the parties to the conflict are only bound to observe 
Article 3 and may ignore all the other Articles. It is obvious, however, that 
each one of them is completely free—and should be encouraged—to declare 
its intention of applying all or part of the remaining provisions.99 
Proponents of an external component to Common Article 1 typically 
point to the “in all circumstances” phrase in the article to support extension 
to non-international armed conflicts. However, as explained above, they 
misunderstand the purpose of that phrase. Indeed, the 1929 Conventions, in 
which the phrase initially appeared, dealt only with what is today labeled 
international armed conflict. That the 1949 Conventions’ “in all 
circumstances” text was not intended to extend the reach of the Common 
Article 1 obligations to non-international armed conflicts is equally apparent. 
For example, the 1952 Geneva Convention I Commentary succinctly provides, 
“the words ‘in all circumstances’ do not relate to civil war.”100 Eight years 
later, the Commentary to Geneva Convention IV again confirmed that 
Common Article 1 is inapplicable to non-international armed conflicts: “The 
words ‘in all circumstances’ which appear in this Article, do not, of course, 
cover the case of civil war, as the rules to be followed in such conflicts are 
laid down by the Convention itself, in Article 3.”101 
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Perhaps most compelling in support of the position that the Common 
Article 1 obligation to ensure respect does not apply in non-international 
armed conflicts is the fact that although Additional Protocol I on 
international armed conflict includes such an obligation, Additional Protocol 
II, which is the first treaty to exclusively address non-international armed 
conflict, does not. Had the States participating in the 1973-1977 Diplomatic 
Conference that produced two Additional Protocols meant the ensure 
respect obligation set forth in Common Article 1 to apply in non-
international armed conflicts, they would have taken the opportunity to 
reiterate the point in Additional Protocol II, as they did for international 
armed conflict in Additional Protocol I. This omission of the obligation in 
Additional Protocol II, therefore, operates as a subsequent agreement 
demonstrating that there was no intention to encompass non-international 
conflict in the Common Article 1 obligations of the Geneva Conventions 
themselves. 
 
VI. CUSTOMARY OBLIGATION TO ENSURE RESPECT 
 
It is clear that Common Article 1 neither contains an external element that 
obligates States that are not party to an international armed conflict to take 
measures to ensure respect by belligerent States nor applies the ensure 
respect obligation as it is properly understood in non-international armed 
conflict. However, the related question of whether such obligations exist as 
a matter of customary law merits brief attention. 
There is widespread consensus that the Conventions now reflect 
customary international law.102 This was acknowledged by the International 
Court of Justice in its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, where the Court 
observed, “these fundamental rules are to be observed by all States whether 
or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they 
constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law.”103 The 
U.N. Secretary-General reached the same conclusion in the report 
introducing the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
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Former Yugoslavia,104 which was subsequently approved by the Security 
Council.105 That there is a customary international law obligation to ensure 
respect mirroring that contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions would 
appear uncontroversial.  
However, as the International Court of Justice observed in its Paramilitary 
Activities judgment, a customary norm that is reflected in a treaty, even if 
identical in meaning at the time, enjoys a separate existence.106 That being so, 
the content of the customary variant may evolve over time. Yet, for the same 
factual reason that attribution of an external element to Common Article 1 
fails, a similar evolution in meaning cannot have occurred with regard to the 
customary obligation to ensure respect—there is insufficient State practice 
or expressions of opinio juris to support such an interpretation.107 Indeed, 
negative practice and contrary opinio juris serve as dispositive confirmation 
that an external component of the ensure respect purported norm has not 
crystallized into customary international law.  
And it must be recalled in this regard that the State practice concerned, 
“including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have 
been both extensive and virtually uniform.”108 State practice evidencing an 
external element is neither. Moreover, the United States’ opposition to the 
notion is particularly important. Given the frequency and intensity with 
which it engages in armed conflict, as well as its unparalleled ability to 
influence the actions of other States that find themselves on the battlefield, 
it surely qualifies as “specially affected” in this regard. 
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Aside from the issue of the existence of an external element, the question 
also remains as to whether a customary law obligation to ensure respect, 
whatever its parameters, has crystallized for application in non-international 
armed conflict. That States are obliged as a matter of customary law to 
respect those rules that apply during a non-international armed conflict is 
self-evident. A State, and therefore both its organs and non-State actors 
whose actions are attributable to the State pursuant to the law of State 
responsibility, must abide by the customary law of war irrespective of 
whether any treaty provision requires it to do so. 
The absence of an obligation to respect and ensure respect in Additional 
Protocol II is instructive on this issue. In that States bear a general 
international legal duty to honor their legal obligations (whether contained 
in law of war or other international law regimes), it was not imperative to 
codify the obligation to respect in Additional Protocol II. However, 
international law generally does not require States to ensure the respect of 
international law rules by entities or individuals whose conduct is not 
attributable to a State as a matter of law. That being so, it seems States would 
have codified, as they often do in treaties, any distinct customary law 
obligation to “ensure respect” during a non-international armed conflict in 
Additional Protocol II so as to emphasize its existence, exactly as they did 
for the ensure respect obligation during international armed conflicts in 
Additional Protocol I. Moreover, no State practice supports the proposition 
that the legal obligation to ensure respect applies in non-international armed 
conflicts. 
Any assertion that an ensure respect obligation exists in customary law 
during a non-international armed conflict also runs counter to the general 
reticence of States to accept obligations with respect to non-international 
armed conflicts. Such conflicts have been regarded by States as primarily 
matters of internal concern. It, therefore, would be counterintuitive to 
presume that States are of the legal view (the opinio juris required for the 
crystallization of a customary rule) that they are required under customary 
law to ensure respect in such conflicts. Indeed, the hesitancy of States to 
accept limitations on their activities during a non-international armed 
conflict is well illustrated by the fact that only Common Article 3 expressly 
applies to non-international armed conflicts in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, and that while Additional Protocol I on international armed 
conflict has 102 articles, Additional Protocol II contains only twenty-eight 












Even if an ensure respect obligation applied during non-international 
armed conflict, the obligation would not include an external element. After 
all, there is even less justification for a conclusion that under customary law 
non-parties to a non-international armed conflict must take measures to 
ensure respect by the parties to the conflict than is the case of international 
armed conflict. The internal nature of the former tends to pose 
comparatively less risk to international security and stability than the latter 
and is, therefore, generally of lesser international concern. Moreover, and as 
just noted, States jealously guard their internal prerogatives. For these 
reasons, if a customary international law obligation to ensure respect existed 
for non-international armed conflict, its scope would not exceed that 
applicable in international armed conflicts and therefore would include no 
duty on the part of States that are not party to a non-international armed 
conflict to ensure respect by those States that are party to the conflict. 
 
VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions’ unique place in the law of war presents both 
opportunity and obligation. Their status as unrivaled common ground 
between States during armed conflict makes the Conventions an attractive 
vehicle for reform. Reform-minded efforts have seized upon them, 
particularly Common Article 1, as an opportunity to give greater 
humanitarian force to their already formidable regulation of hostilities. While 
reformers’ motives are perhaps laudable, they have, to date, offered 
insufficient evidence to support their claim that the Common Article 1 
“ensure respect” obligation includes an external component. 
First, their accounts do not accord with or account for the original 
meaning of the article. The negotiating history of Common Article 1 makes 
it clear that States understood the Article would only impose internal 
compliance obligations on States for the conduct of their own armed forces 
and groups under their control during international armed conflicts to which 
they are a party. Second, expansive accounts of Common Article 1 misjudge 
the practice of States subsequent to adoption of Common Article 1. 
Assessment of the seventy years of practice reveals neither explicit 
subsequent agreement by States to modify their Common Article 1 
obligation nor sufficient subsequent State practice to establish agreement to 
that effect. In fact, negative State practice concerning external obligations 











If the Conventions offer unparalleled humanitarian opportunity, they 
surely demand comparable obligations of reverence and care in their 
interpretation. To sustain the Conventions’ reach and reputation as legal 
common ground requires meticulous attention to the bargains struck and 
consented to by States. Reform through immoderate interpretation rather 
than formal amendment or other established processes threatens not only to 
distort the meaning of carefully considered and formulated legal doctrine. It 
threatens to divide the community of States and erode the Conventions’ 
status as vital legal common ground between States during armed conflict. 
 
